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Abstract
Renewable energy is an important and growing percentage of the total power supply.
Additionally, non-wires alternatives, which are meant to substitute for the construc-
tion of more transmission lines, are increasing in quantity as the demand for electrical
power increases. Many non-wires alternatives take the form of renewable energy re-
sources and batteries, and are distributed over short distances through neighborhoods
and communities. Inverters are used to connect these DC resources to the AC grid.
However, there is growing industry concern that the disconnect function that is
inherent to interconnection standards for inverter-based resources has the potential
to result in a cascading failure if voltages deviate significantly from nominal.
This thesis studies the conditions under which a cascading inverter collapse of this
sort could occur. More specifically, it identifies engineering design parameters, such
as time constants, that influence the speed and nature of these cascades, using a new
model called Time-Dependant Inverters Model (TiDIM). While this model is prelim-
inary, the results suggest that risk increases with a number of factors including large
transmission or distribution line impedances, a large variance in inverter voltage set-
points, and an inappropriate number of inverter-based resources that can contribute
to supplying too much or not enough power. Next, the thesis characterizes the risk at
which one may expect this sort of event to occur as a function of line impedance and
the resultant voltage magnitude. It is found that a greater proportion of inverter-
connected power in the grid is associated with a higher probability of collapse, and a
greater variance in inverter behavior is associated with a wider transition band, which
is defined in this thesis as the range of impedances/voltages where the probability of
collapse is an uncertain. Lastly, the thesis identifies cost-e ective strategies to reduce
the likelihood of such an event.
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The bulk power grid is an amazing system that supplies electricity with over 99.9%
reliability.. However, the ever-evolving structure introduces risks that may make it
di cult to maintain this level of reliability looking forward. The mission of a power
systems electrical engineer is to ensure that power systems operate with a very high
level of reliability at a reasonable cost.
Due to declining costs of renewable energy, coal plants are retiring rapidly in
many states. Now, a diverse set of generation exists: solar, wind, hydro, biomass,
geothermal, and small-scale generation such as roof-top solar, in addition to tradi-
tional generation. This portfolio has many advantages, but is also more di cult to
manage. These resources vary in availability, and, for the first time on a large scale,
the flow of electricity is not necessarily one-way from generation to consumer. With
the rise of behind-the-meter generation like roof-top solar, this flow can become bidi-
rectional depending on the number of solar panels, the load, the time of day, and
other factors. The grid’s infrastructure was not built to handle this two-way flow.
Another way the state of the grid has changed is overall volume. As population,
infrastructure, services, and economic activity grows, so does the need for electricity.
Additionally, energy-consuming machines like vehicles are increasingly becoming more
electrified. However, building new transmission or distribution lines or updating sub-
stations can be expensive and it can be unclear who is responsible for the investment
capital. It appears to be much more cost-e ective to encourage behind-the-meter
photovoltaics (PV), Tesla battery walls, and other consumer-side distributed energy
resources (DERs). The generation and consumption of electrical power stays close to
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the source and does not require the long-distance line upgrades that may otherwise
be necessary. These options to meet the growing demand are called non-wires alter-
natives (NWAs) because the addition of new wires such as transmission lines are not
required.
One of the technologies that makes all of this possible is a power electronic device
called an inverter. Inverters convert DC electricity from PV, wind, and batteries to
AC electricity, which is what the grid uses. Resources that are connected to the grid
via an inverter are known as inverter-based resources (IBRs). If any irregular voltage
is detected, they will disconnect and interrupt the electrical connection between the
grid and the DC equipment in order to protect workers, who must know where live
power lines are and need the guarantee that when the power is shut o , there is no
additional power injection. This essential feature, which is dictated by the IEEE
1547 standard (discussed in further detail below), has the potential to also make that
irregularity into a bigger problem, which is discussed in detail below.
The goal of this work is to to understand and identify risk factors for IBR-
influenced cascading events, to quantify the likelihood of such an event occurring,
and to identify cost-e ective risk strategies.
1.1.1 Non-Wire Alternatives and Distributed En-
ergy Resources
As previously mentioned, DERs such as IBRs can be another option to building
more infrastructure, serving as NWAs. DERs are especially useful for meeting peak
loads [1], which require a lot of energy but do not occur often. It has already been
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shown that distributed generation (DG), of which DERs are a subset, can defer the
investment costs from planning new network additions [2], [3]. And over the last 10
years, the cost of PV has dropped by more than 65% [4]; the prices in wind power have
dropped by about 40% [5]. These factors, along with renewability, sustainablility, and
other benefits, are large contributors to why there is an increase in NWAs.
1.2 Features of IEEE-1547 Compliant In-
verters
Inverters are responsible for converting DC to AC; without them, using PV and bat-
teries in an AC-dominated grid would not be possible. This makes environmentally-
friendly PV and energy-storing batteries feasible options for individual consumers as
well as large-scale PV farms or battery banks.
Inverters also have a safety feature to protect humans from dangerous live power
lines if an abnormal voltage magnitude or frequency is detected and the grid needs to
be serviced. If the voltage strays too far from nominal, the inverter will disconnect
after a certain amount of time, called voltage ridethrough time. If the voltage is
relatively close to nominal, the inverter waits longer before disconnecting, which is
to say that the ridethrough time is large; if the voltage is significantly far o  from
nominal, then the inverter will disconnect more quickly [6].
Once the inverter disconnects, or ‘trips,’ it will stay disconnected for a certain
amount of time, such as five minutes or indefinitely. Once this happens, there is no
power flow to or from the bulk grid, so the grid’s load is not receiving power from
the disconnected IBR. In an isolated case, this loss of power can be negligible. If
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the system contains a large amount of IBRs, then the loss of power can significantly
upset the power balance of supply and load. This can cause the voltage anomaly to
become worse, resulting in the disconnection of even more inverters. This chain of
events has the potential to cause an IBR-based cascading failure event. The type of
event that results is called a voltage collapse, which occurs when physical limits are
violated and system equilibrium is lost, thereby causing power outages [7].
Inverters have another mode called momentary cessation. The inverter is still
electrically connected, but pauses in injecting current to the grid if the voltage mag-
nitude becomes too large or small; this pause is generally one second or less [8]. In
either case - disconnection or momentary cessation - once the inverter resumes, it
injects power with a ramp rate from zero power to pre-disconnection power levels.
1.3 Current State of IBR Events
The threat of an IBR-based cascading failure event is not a figment of science fic-
tion, but one that has already occurred in reality. One of the most well-documented
examples is the Blue Cut Fire Outage in southern California from 2016. A wildfire
started near the Blue Cut hiking trail, and, more importantly, near an important
transmission corridor with five high voltage transmission lines. There were thirteen
line faults that day, resulting in loss of PV generation, the largest of which was a
1200MW loss. What is significant is that the loss in generation resulted not directly
from the fire burning PV modules, but from the faults that the electricity-conducting
plasma fire caused. The inverters that connected the PV disconnected in some cases
when they perceived an abnormally low voltage frequency, and in other cases when
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the voltage magnitude was too low [8]. In 2017, two faults resulted from the Canyon
2 Fire Disturbance, also in southern California. 1600MW of power was lost [9].
There are also two documented events that took place in Australia. One is called
the South Australian Blackout, which also took place in 2016. Tornado damage to
three high voltage lines caused six faults resulting in a loss of 900MW from inverter-
connected wind farms. The other is known as the South Australia System Event,
where a damaged bus caused three faults, with losses including 400MW thermal and
150MW rooftop PV [9].
It is expected that these types of events will continue to occur and may increase
in frequency as PV and other DERs become more popular. As of June 2019, 67GW
of PV capacity had been installed in the U.S., and the capacity installed per year is
predicted to double over the next 5 years [10].
There is a growing and valuable literature on the impact of PV generation on
power systems reliability and stability. Some have found that inverter output voltage
is sensitive to sudden change [11]. Others argue that remote monitoring and fault
detection of PV systems is necessary because in some cases faulty components will
not accurately sense the conditions and disconnect [12], which is related to to the
lifetime of PV-to grid inverters [13] and the components that make up inverters [14].
Another factor that is important to PV inverter performance under voltage fluctu-
ations is influence from grid-fault controllers and control strategies based on using
continuous values for control parameters [15]. To increase stability of systems with
a significant amount of distributed energy resources (DERS), solar power output can
be adjusted to respond to changes in voltage [16]. Additionally, fault response anal-
ysis of such systems can be conducted by updating conventional analytical network
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analysis techniques [17]. Though PV systems can seem fragile, there are indications
that PV systems can withstand natural disasters and function after the event [18].
1.4 Power Losses During Fault
This section introduces the concept of why line faults create dramatic changes in
voltage. In the chapters that follow, a low-voltage situation will be created by forcing
a transmission line to fault, so it’s important to understand the physical processes
that occur.
The guiding equation for this problem can be derived from the circuit diagram
shown in Figure 1.1. Snet is the di erence in power between the load, Sd, and the
power supplied by the IBRs, Ss. The load and IBRs are located at the same bus as
V2. Zeq is the equivalent impedance, or 12Z.
Figure 1.1: Circuit representation of two-line transmission system
7
A simple V = IZ gives us









which can be substituted into the previous equation. Then,
V ú2 (V1 ≠ V2) = Zeq(Súd ≠ Sús ) (1.4)
and
V ú1 V2 ≠ |V2|2 = ZeqSúnet (1.5)
V1 is a constant 1.0 pu, so V2 is the only voltage left in the equation. To solve, V2
can be broken down into its real and imaginary parts:
Im{V2} = Im{ZeqSúnet} (1.6)
and
Re{V2}≠ Re{|V2|2} = Re{ZeqSúnet} (1.7)
or
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Re{V2}≠ (Re{V2}2 + Im{V2}2)≠ Re{ZeqSúnet} = 0 (1.8)
Re{V2} can be solved using the quadratic equation. Then, V2 = Re{V2}+jIm{V2}.
V2 is solved for at every time step using the updated Snet.
Before any fault or disturbance occurs, Zeq = 12Z. After the fault, one branch goes
o -line, so Zeq = Z and therefore line losses double and the voltage drop increases.
Because less power is being supplied to the bus with V2, the voltage will decrease.
9
Chapter 2
Understanding factors that influ-
ence the risk of a cascade of out-
ages due to inverter disconnection
10
This chapter has previously been published as a conference paper: C. Popiel and P.
D. H. Hines, “Understanding factors that influence the risk of a cascade of outages due
to inverter disconnection” 2019 North American Power Symposium (NAPS), Wichita,
KS, USA, 2019, pp. 1-6.
2.1 Abstract
Because of the rapid growth in distributed solar generation, there is growing concern
that inverter-connected generators, which are designed to automatically disconnect
under abnormal voltage conditions, could disconnect in a manner that would lead to
a cascade of outages and ultimately instability or voltage collapse. This paper stud-
ies the conditions under which a cascading inverter collapse of this sort could occur.
More specifically, we identify engineering design parameters, such as time constants,
that influence the speed and nature of these cascades. While this model is prelimi-
nary, the results suggest that risk increases with a number of factors including: large
transmission or distribution line impedances, a large variance in inverter voltage set-
points, and an inappropriate number of inverter-based resources that can contribute




Number of inverters N -
Load Pd MW
Line resistance R p.u.
Line reactance X p.u.
Nominal Voltage V0 p.u.
Acc. voltage, low VL p.u.
Acc. voltage, high VH p.u.
New voltage Vi,t p.u.
New area An voltseconds
Maximum area Amax voltseconds
‡ on max area A‡ voltseconds
Time step dt seconds
Simulation time ts sec
Time of fault tf sec
2.3 Introduction
Inverters are an integral part of all solar photovoltaic generation systems. As dis-
tributed PV generation forms an increasingly large fraction of the power supply port-
folio, the discrete and continuous dynamics of inverters become increasingly critical
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to power system reliability, security and resilience.
Renewable energy has a number of important benefits in terms of mitigating
air emissions from fossil fuel power plants; thus, removing barriers or challenges to
incorporating renewable distributed energy resources is important. One potential
barrier to PV adoption is the growing concern among industry professionals about
the potential for cascading grid failures due to unexpected inverter disconnections.
As specified in IEEE Standard 1547 [6], inverters are typically designed to disconnect
when exposed to abnormal voltage or frequency conditions. While these rules are
important to protect equipment and to ensure safety, inverter disconnection rules
change the discrete dynamics of a power system and have the potential to trigger
cascading failures.
Cascading failures and the blackouts that can result are not new to the electricity
industry. One of the most infamous examples is the August 2003 blackout in the
Northeast United States and Southern Canada, which was triggered by a number of
events, including power lines contacting overgrown trees [19]. Many steps have been
taken to protect against cascading blackouts [20, 21], such as improved reliability
standards and additional oversight by NERC. Given that inverter-connected power
plants make up an increasingly large fraction of the power supply portfolio there is
need for tools that help us to better understand the potential cascading failure risk
associated with this new generation.
There is substantial industry concern about the potential for cascading inverter
failures. Analyses of a number of previous power system disturbances suggest that
inverter disconnections can lead to loss of generation.
In this chapter, we will focus specifically on identifying parameters that could
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increase the risk of inverter-caused cascading failure, and more specifically determine
the range of values that could impact blackout risk. We will do this using a new
simulation model called the Time-Dependant Inverters Model (TiDIM), which is able
to identify factors that contribute to voltage collapse.
2.4 Methods
Inverter disconnections change power system dynamics because each inverter is sup-
plying a certain amount of power to the system, and when an inverter disconnects,
it is no longer contributes to the total (active or reactive) power generated. As a
result, generation and load are no longer balanced, leading to changes in both voltage
frequency and magnitude.
IEEE 1547 makes recommendations for when an inverter should disconnect due
to o -nominal voltage conditions. Per IEEE 1547, there is a non-zero time delay
between when an abnormality is detected and when the disconnection occurs, which
is known as fault ride through time. The time delays specified in 1547-2003 are
summarized in Table 2.1.1 This thesis uses these time delays to represent the fact
that most existing inverters were designed to meet the 2003 standard. The default
settings specified in 1547-2018 are similar, but the inverter settings can be adjusted to
allowable ride through times upwards of 20 seconds for some abnormal voltages [22].
Therefore, it may be necessary to consider a wider variety of time delays in future
work. Regardless, it is necessary to take this time delay into account when building a
model, rather than having an inverter disconnect the instant the abnormality occurs.
1This table is taken from IEEE 1547’s table 1. [6]
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Table 2.1: Interconnection system response to abnormal voltages
In order to accurately simulate these time delays, we need a measure of the like-
lihood that a particular inverter will disconnect given its prior history of voltage or
frequency (note that the results in this thesis come from a quasi-steady-state model
and thus do not include frequency). In order to accurately capture this time-delay
in simulations, we introduce the idea of ‘under-voltage area’ (UVA), or just area, in
which each inverter will disconnect when the accumulated under- or over-voltages area
exceeds a pre-specified limit. The area is a function of di erence between acceptable
voltage and actual voltage, and the time that is allowed at that voltage. There is an
upper voltage limit to the safe voltage range, VH , as well as a lower limit, VL, thus
two functions were derived in order to account for the two situations.
At the beginning of each simulation in TiDIM, a maximum threshold area is
calculated based on using both VH and VL which are then averaged together. The
formulae to find these thresholds take the form:
Amax = a1V 6 + a2V 5 + a3V 4 + a4V 3 + a5V 2 + a6V + a7, (2.2)
where the coe cients, as derived from parameters in IEEE 1547, are listed in Ta-
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Figure 2.1: Voltage and Area Accumulation
ble 2.2. A di erent set of coe cients was calculated for both cases: V = VH and
V = VL. There is a very small number representing uncertainty, ‡, around VH and
VL, which is why this quantity is calculated every time the simulation is run rather
than being a stagnant number. Once Amax is calculated, it is then constant for the
rest of the simulation. Next, we need a way of deciding whether the accumulated
area has exceeded the threshold Amax at each time step. To do so, at each time step
t TiDIM uses the following di erence equation:
A[t+ 1] = A[t] + An[t] (2.3)
where A[t] is the current amount of area accumulated and An[t] is the new area
accumulated at time step t. When voltages are within limits, An[t] = 0. When
16
voltages our outside of the limits An[t] has the form:
An[t] = 100(b1V 6 + b2V 5 + b3V 4 + b4V 3
+b5V 2 + b6V + b7) t,
(2.4)





a4 - 26.339 2062.3
a5 5.2588 -1637.6
a6 - 0.2528 515.38
a7 0 1.1
with the coe cients listed in Table 2.3. 100 is the normalization factor. Because
the equations for An are nonlinear, area accumulates faster when voltage strays further
outside of the nominal voltage range.
17







b6 - 5.2201 -225.27
b7 1.76 1.1
When a simulation is initiated, each inverter is given a custom value of Amax,i,
which deviates from the original Amax using a Gaussian random variable with mean
0 and standard deviation ‡A. When Ai[t] exceeds Amax,i, inverter i disconnects from
the system. Because each Amax,i is slightly di erent, the inverters disconnect at a
di erent time points during the simulation.
TiDIM also comes insured with accident forgiveness. If the voltage returns to the
acceptable range, the accumulated area is set back to zero. If the voltage begins to
stray again, the area accumulates from zero with no previous memory of past area.
2.5 Results




Figure 2.2: Illustration of the two-bus test case used for simulations in this thesis.
The test case used in this thesis, shown in Figure 2.2, is a two bus model with a
voltage-controlled generator at bus 1 and a large number of PV systems and a load
at bus 2. In the pre-fault scenario, there are two identical transmission lines between
the two buses. A simulation begins at t = 0. At t = 0.1 sec, one of two parallel
transmission lines faults and is immediately removed from service to introduce an
initial disturbance. The parameters for the base case can be found in Table 2.4.
Applying TiDIM to the test case and varying the various parameters allows one to
understand the impact of these parameters on a power system. In Figure 2.3 and each
of the subsequent plots, the broad, shaded region shows the 5th and 95th percentile
of possible outcomes from one set of initial conditions. The range is due to small
sources of uncertainty within the initial conditions. The darkened line is the mean of
the results for that set of conditions. The high voltage at the far left of the plot shows
the pre-fault voltage. This plot shows that even with the same initial conditions, a
wide range of results are possible. As previously mentioned, there is a ‡A for Amax.
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The following parameters also have a small ‡ to represent variability in the value due
to conditions or uncertainty of the exact value: VL, VH , and V0.
Figure 2.3: Voltage at bus 2 in the base case simulation. Note that the shaded region in this
and each of the plots represents the 5% to 95% percentile results.









2.5.2 Initial Load, Pd,0
Voltage collapse occurs when the net load at bus two exceeds the total transfer capa-
bility of the transmission path from bus 1 to bus 2. Hence, there is a critical point
around Pd = 480MW where the system is able to survive for a fairly long period of
time without inverter outages that could lead to cascading failures. Due to the in-
verter parameter variability in TiDIM, there is no precise single value for the critical
point. (If all ‡s representing variability in TiDIM are set to zero, then this inflection
point is Pd = 485MW.) Before and after this point of precarious balance, the time to
failure increases with the load and then decreases again once the load becomes too
large (Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4: Bus 2 Voltage over time with varying initial loads, Pd,0
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2.5.3 Area limit variation, ‡A
The e ect that ‡A has is two-fold, which can be seen in Figure 2.5. First of all,
‡A determines how long the system will persist before collapsing: a small ‡A leads
to prolonged persistence, while a large ‡A leads to more imminent failure. When
‡A is small, this indicates that many of the inverters in the system are of the same
demographic, and when ‡A is large, it indicates that there is a wide range of inverter
type, brand, age, and so on. Secondly, ‡A changes the shape of the collapse curve.
When ‡A is small, many of the inverters disconnect at the same time, which leads to
a sudden voltage collapse. When ‡A is larger, the voltage collapses more gradually;
although the collapse occurs relatively quickly because of some inverters having a low
area limit, it is still not a sudden drop in voltage and may be easier to detect before
it is too late to react.
Figure 2.5: Bus 2 Voltage over time with varying ‡A on area limits
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2.5.4 Number of Inverters, N
The number of inverters is directly proportional to the power supplied by the PV
sources, and additionally, we assume that all PV modules supply the same amount
of power to the system, 10kW per installation.
Figure 2.6: Bus 2 Voltage over time with varying numbers of inverters, N
As with load, increasing or decreasing the number of inverters beyond the less-
risky region led to a quicker voltage collapse in Figure 2.6.
2.5.5 Transmission Line Reactance, X
As one would expect, the e ect of the reactance in the voltage collapse is quite
significant, as seen in Figure 2.7. Over a relatively small range of reactance values,
varying X can lead to anything from near immediate collapse (X = 0.26 p.u., not
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shown on plot) to no collapse at all. In fact, a mere 0.01 p.u. is enough to swing the
outcome from near certain safety to near certain failure. This result suggests that
reactance (i.e., proximity to voltage collapse) strongly influences the likelihood of an
inverter cascade.
Figure 2.7: Bus 2 Voltage over time with varying X
2.5.6 Transmission Line Resistance, R
While minute changes in X had a substantial impact on the likelihood of a cascade,
changes in the resistance did not have such a drastic e ect. Reducing R by an entire
magnitude resulted in very little change (Figure 2.8). Increasing R resulted in some
change (a quicker voltage collapse), but it is necessary to increase R by an order of
magnitude from the test case resistance in order to get a significant change in the
results. As would be expected from standard models of voltage collapse, changing R
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has a much smaller impact on cascading risk, relative to changing X.
Figure 2.8: Bus 2 Voltage over time with varying R
2.5.7 Non-significant parameters
Additional experiments were performed to understand the impact of varying ‡s on
VL, VH , and V0. The results suggest that these parameters have very little impact on
the likelihood of a cascade.
2.6 Conclusions
The results of the experiments run in this chapter are summarized in Table 2.5. From
these results it is clear that a large reactance, a large resistance, and a larger ‡A can
contribute to a higher risk of or an increased speed of cascading inverter failures.
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Among the reactance and resistance, the results confirm conventional power systems
results, which would suggest that changes in reactance can dramatically change the
risk of voltage collapse. Additionally, a large mismatch between load and power
supplied by inverter-based sources can also contribute to a higher risk of failure.
It is our intention that as this model matures, TiDIM will enable engineers to
better understand the conditions that lead to dangerous inverter failure cascades
and use the insights that results to design systems that are more resilient to wide
scale collapses. While the results from the two-bus test case used in this chapter
provide insight into the general problem of inverter cascades, we acknowledge that it
is di cult to draw broad conclusions from a single, small test case. Future work will
provide deeper insight into this problem through the use of more detailed dynamical
models and larger test cases. Although the results from this early work are tentative,
they provide useful insight into an important and timely power systems problem.
Future work, in part discussed below, will expand on these results and provide more
actionable engineering conclusions.
Table 2.5: Results Summary
Parameter Region of Increased Risk
‡A larger is riskier
N dependant on typical demand
X > 0.16 p.u.
R > 0.03 p.u.
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Chapter 3
Characterizing the Risk of Cas-
cading Inverter Disconnection in




Renewable resources are an important and growing percentage of the total power
supply, and inverters are used to connect these resources (as well as batteries) to the
grid. However, there is growing industry concern that the disconnect function that
is inherent to the design of inverter-based resources has the potential to result in a
cascading failure if voltages deviate significantly from nominal. In this paper, we
aim to characterize the risk at which one may expect this sort of event to occur as
a function of line impedance and the resultant voltage magnitude. We find that a
greater proportion of inverter-connected power in the grid is associated with a higher
probability of collapse, and a greater variance in inverter behavior is associated with
a wider transition band, which we define in this paper as the range of voltages where
the probability of collapse is an uncertain.
In a world where renewable generation is necessary to secure a fossil-fuel free
future, inverters are equally necessary, as they connect the dc electricity generated
from renewables such as PV into the ac electricity that the grid uses. However, a
large penetration of inverter-based resources (IBRs) is also associated with a threat
to voltage stability [23] especially since many of the older inverters currently in the
field may not have reactive power functionality.
Inverter-influenced cascading failure is not a theoretical concept but one which has
already occurred multiple times. One example of this is the previously discussed Blue
Cut Fire disturbance, an event where a fire in southern California caused faults to
important transmission lines that resulted in PV generation loss, the greatest of which
was a 1,200MW loss [8]. Other examples include the Canyon 2 Fire disturbance in
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California in 2017, the South Australian Blackout in 2016, and the South Australian
System Event in 2017 [9]. Among these four examples, three are su ered from loss of
generation and widespread tripping of inverters, and the South Australian Blackout
is classified as a cascading failure event.
We have identified these questions as important concerns to investigate because
of the growing number of non-wires alternatives (NWAs), discussed in Chapter 1.
Demand for electrical power is increasing as infrastructure and electrification increase,
and instead of building more transmission lines, NWAs such as PV are installed
instead. This localized, renewable energy is a good thing, but NWAs are not without
consequences, which we hope to identify and quantify in this chapter.
The goal of this chapter is to characterize the risk of cascading inverter discon-
nection under di erent power systems conditions and IBR characteristics. Because
we know that these events are possible in the future, it is imperative that risks as-
sociated with a cascade of inverter disconnections be identified so that we can be
prepared for them and ideally avoid them all together. Specifically, we will vary
percentage of power supplied by the inverters and variability in inverter behavior,
and increase the base load. Doing this will help address the question of the risk of
an inverter-influenced cascading event based on a given situation (time of day, load,
inverter variability). This will be done using our simulation model, TiDIM, which is
able to show changes in voltage magnitude after an event by disconnecting inverters
in the model to reflect the voltage ridethrough time.
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3.2 Methods
Inverter disconnections change power system dynamics because each inverter sup-
plies a certain amount of power to the system, and when an inverter disconnects,
it no longer contributes to the total (active or reactive) power generated, e ectively
increasing net load. As a result, sudden changes in net load lead to changes in volt-
age frequency and magnitude. This chapter focuses on voltage magnitude but it is
important to note that frequency can also be a ected and will be included in future
work.
IEEE 1547 makes recommendations for when an inverter should disconnect due
to o -nominal voltage conditions, as previously discussed. The time delays specified
in 1547-2003 are summarized in Table 2.1. This chapter also uses these time delays
to represent the fact that most existing inverters were designed to meet the 2003
standard. Additionally, regulatory agencies have only recently begun enforcing the
interconnection standards in the updated 2018 rules.
In order to accurately simulate these time delays, we need a measure of the like-
lihood that a particular inverter will disconnect given its prior history of voltage or
frequency. In order to accurately capture this time delay in simulations, we intro-
duced the idea of under-voltage area (UVA) in the previous chapter. To summarize,
UVA provides a way to integrate the amount of under (or over) voltage over time.
When UVA exceeds a certain limit (calibrated to align with the timings set by IEEE
1547, called Amax in the previous chapter), the inverter will disconnect. Amax is varied
by some amount ‡A in each simulation, to represent the variability that may exist in
inverter behavior in the field. There is a very small number representing uncertainty,
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V‡, around the upper voltage limit, VL, given by IEEE-1547, which was found in the
previous chapter to have little impact om results.
Given that inverters are designed to disconnect under certain voltage conditions,
it is useful to define the term ‘transition band’ as it pertains to our work. In every
case we examine, there is a voltage above which a fault will almost never lead to
voltage collapse, and a voltage below which a fault will almost always lead to collapse.
Between these two voltages, where the outcome is not certain, is the transition band,
where either collapse or stabilization is possible. As we will see below, the transition
band varies in width and location based on amount of inverter-supplied power and
inverter behavior.
To study the probability of failure, we used a Monte-Carlo technique to vary
the load and percent of power supplied by inverters in order to change the post-
disturbance voltage of each simulation. Then, we separated the results into bins and
assigned a probability based on the number of fails over total runs for each bin. For
computational simplicity, we assume that voltage collapse occurs whenever voltage
magnitude is at or below 0.8 p.u.
Figure 3.1 shows the parameters that were varied to achieve our range our results.
The base load (100MW), line impedance (0.022+0.11i p.u.), time step size (0.01s), and
power supplied by each inverter module (10kW) were kept constant. The percentage
of load supplied by IBR power and ‡A were changed by the user, and the changes
to these parameters, in conjunction with the growth factors and Amaxs drawn from
gaussian distributions, resulted in the variations to the load, amount of IBR power,
and Amax actually used in the simulation. A total of 200,000 simulations were run in
order to produce the figures below.
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Figure 3.1: This figure illustrates the inputs to and outputs from TiDIM for this chapter.
3.3 Results
This section provides a set of results that illustrate the application of TiDIM to a
two-bus test case. First, we present a test case and the rate of inverter disconnection
in order to orient ourselves with what a voltage collapse curve tends to look like in
the scenario we have created. Next, we move onto probability of voltage collapse, or
risk, given a certain set of circumstances. The validation test is created by looking at
the post-fault voltage and calculating the probability of collapse at that voltage. The
probability of collapse as a function of amount of IBR-based power will show how risk
changes throughout the day (di erent amounts of sunlight) and as more and more
people adopt rooftop PV and other IBRs. Lastly, the probability of collapse due to
a simultaneous increase in load and increase in IBR power is examined to determine
how big of an impact these factors cause as NWAs rise.
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3.3.1 Test Case
Figure 3.2: Voltage at bus 2 in the base case simulation. Note that the shaded region in this
and each of the plots represents the 5% to 95% percentile results. The parameters here are
100% inverter-supplied power, 0.13 p.u. line impedance, and medium variance.
The test case used in this thesis, shown in Figure 2.2, is a two bus model with a
voltage-controlled generator at bus 1 and a large number of PV systems and a load
at bus 2. In the pre-fault scenario, there are two identical transmission lines between
the two buses. A simulation begins at t = 0. At t = 0.1sec, one of two parallel
transmission lines faults and is immediately removed from service to introduce an
initial disturbance. This is the same scenario as introduced in Chapter 2.
Applying TiDIM to the test case and varying the various parameters allows one
to understand the impact of these parameters on a power system. In Figure 3.2 and
each of the subsequent plots, the broad, shaded region shows the 5th through 95th
percentile of possible outcomes from one set of initial conditions. The range is due
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to small sources of uncertainty within the initial conditions. The darkened line is
the mean of the results for that set of conditions, and the initial voltage at the far
left of the plot shows the pre-fault voltage. This plot shows that even with the same
initial conditions, a wide range of results are possible due to the ‡s discussed above.
Figure 3.2 does not represent all scenarios but most voltage collapses tend to follow
the shape of this curve.
3.3.2 Validation Test with Probability of Fail-
ure as a Function of Post-Event Voltage
As we can expect, the lower the immediate post-event voltage is, the greater the prob-
ability of failure is. When the voltage begins low, area accumulates faster, inverters
disconnect sooner, and this increases the chance of a collapse. Figure 3.3 demon-
strates this trend. The transition band is between 0.80 and 0.90 p.u., with certain
failure below the lower limit and certain safety above.
Interestingly, the transition band is not monotonically decreasing with the increase
in voltage. These spikes in the middle of the bands represent phase transitions, which
are discussed in part below.
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Figure 3.3: Probability of failure as a function of voltage at the first time step post-fault
3.3.3 Probability of Failure due to Amount of
IBR Power
One factor of the probability of failure is the percentage of the load that is supplied
with power from inverter-connected sources. A range of examples are shown here,
from approximately 10% of load met by IBRs, representing morning, evening, or a
cloudy day to approximately 100%, representing a sunny midday. These conditions
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Figure 3.4: Probability of Failure vs. Post-Event Voltage, based on inverter percentage
and variability. Note that the colored bars represent collapse and lack of color represents
stabilization, so the goal is to reduce the colored area by as much as possible.
can also represent non-PV sourced IBR power, such as a windy or calm day on a
wind farm. It is also possible to have 0% (no IBRs) and over 100%, on a day that is
especially sunny or windy and load is not too high.
When there are no IBRs in the system, the probability of collapse is about 80%.
This is, of course, not how any power engineer would design their system. Our pre-
fault conditions have been engineered so that the pre-fault voltage is lower than what
a system would normally operate at, which represents some weakness in the system
that makes it more susceptible to total failure if some fault then occurs. To put it
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simply, there would be very few results to be drawn about inverters from a perfect
system.
3.3.4 Effect of Growth on Probability of Fail-
ure
Figure 3.5: Probability of collapse as a function of growth factor, —, for 10%-30% IBR-
sourced power
One of our research questions is how the growth of electrical load e ects the probabil-
ity of failure, while large amounts of IBRs as NWAs are simultaneously implemented.
Figures 3.5 through 3.7 show the probability of collapse as a function of the amount
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of load at bus 2 in our test system. The growth factor, –, is the multiple of the base
load, Pd, which we define in this section to be 100MW. When – > 1, the load has
been increased to greater than 100MW. Therefore, the net load is
Snet = –(Pd,base ≠ PIBR) (3.2)
The top rows show low-variation inverters (‡A = 0.2), and the bottom shows high-
variation inverters (‡A = 0.8). The subplots are further broken down into amount of
IBR power. For example, if the amount of IBR power is 10%, then 10% of the base
load for any of the base loads in that subplot comes from IBRs. And then in the
next one, 20%, and so on; the percentage (as well as ‡A) is what is constant for that
particular subplot.
What is unique about increasing the load is that the percent of IBR power sup-
plying that load greatly shapes the probability of collapse profile. For low amounts
of IBR power (Figure 3.5, 10%-30%), there is a very small transition band; below
— = 1.4, probability of collapse is low and above — = 1.8, collapse is almost certain.
For — Ø 40%, there is a region of apparent stability in the transition band, or an
unexpected “spike.” This region of stability shifts from about — = 1.4 to about — = 3.0
as the percent of load met by IBR power increases from 40% to 90%. Interestingly,
the region of stability only appears in the case where inverter variation is low.
For high-variation inverters, there is a transition band with no initial spike in prob-
ability of collapse. This transition band shifts to higher —s as IBR power increases.
This makes sense because a large load (large —) is balanced by a large amount of IBR
power and a small load is better balanced by a small amount of IBR power. There-
fore, as the load increases, it is better to have a matching amount of IBR power,
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Figure 3.6: Probability of collapse as a function of growth factor, —, for 40%-60% IBR-
sourced power
and the greater number of inverters that are used as a result appear to not increase
the chances of a voltage collapse. High-variation inverters also decrease or eliminate
the transition band’s spike, allowing for a wide range of —s that do not have a high
probability of collapse.
The transition band spike in the low-variations cases, though, leaves some room
for further investigation. For this further study, we will examine the low-variation,
70% IBR power case.
Figure 3.8 shows the voltage curves for three di erent loads: low (before the spike),
medium (in the middle of the spike), and high (after the spike, but before the final
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Figure 3.7: Probability of collapse as a function of growth factor, —, for 70%-90% IBR-
sourced power
transition to guaranteed voltage collapse).
The medium load case is interesting because there are three distinct groups of
voltage collapses. One group is steady and does not drop below the failure voltage
of 0.8 p.u. One group drops in voltage very quickly and then remains constant,
due to the fact that all possible inverters have disconnected and there is not a way
for the voltage to drop any more. In between these two voltage collapse groups is a
‘waterfall’ voltage collapse group, which is characterized by two small drops in voltage
that eventually lead to collapse. When the load is much bigger or smaller, as shown by
the 180MW and 280MW subplots, the waterfall group does not exist. The waterfall
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Figure 3.8: Voltage collapse curves for the low-variation, 70% IBR power case
group only appears in the loads that correspond to the transition band spike —s that
represent the same loads. This indicates that when there are three voltage groups
including a waterfall group, the risk of collapse is high.
The next figure, Figure 3.9, is a plot of the change in voltage magnitude that
occurs when one inverter disconnects as a function of load. This change in voltage,
dV, is shown for the 70% IBR case as well as the 50%, 60%, 80%, and 90% cases
surrounding it. We can see that when the load is small, dV is relatively large to when
the load is small. This makes sense because when there is a small amount of power,
the loss of one inverter’s power is big, and the change in voltage due to this one
inverter is also big. When there’s a large amount of power concerned, one inverter
does not matter that much.
Ergo, there are two opposing forces that are captured in Figures 3.5 through 3.7.
Normally, when the load, or —, is small, the risk of voltage collapse is small; however,
in Figure 3.9, we showed that inverter disconnection makes a bigger di erence in the
voltage when the load is small. We hypothesize that these two trends interfere with
each other to create the transition band spike.
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Figure 3.9: Change in voltage magnitude due to the loss of power from one disconnected
inverter, which decreases as the load increases
When inverter variation is high, the waterfall group does not exist (figure not
shown); this particular group of voltage collapse curves is unique to the low-variation
inverters, as is the transition band spike at these same loads. Therefore, we hypoth-
esize that the abrupt disconnection of inverters in the low-variation case may help
influence the creation of the transition band spike and waterfall group.
3.4 Conclusions
A positive conclusion that we can tentatively draw based on our work is that in most
events with a transmission line fault, the presence of inverters will not lead to a voltage
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collapse scenario; this is based on the assumption that most events do not fall below
about 0.95 p.u. in voltage magnitude. However, based on recent historical data, we
know that inverter-influenced cascading failure does occasionally occur, which is why
it is important to consider the implications of the presence of a significant number of
inverters.
We acknowledge that in most events, a system’s voltage will usually not drop as
low as shown here in the results from our simulations. However, this work demon-
strates the predictability (or, rather, unpredictability) of the outcome from a given
situation, which is not fully determined. This work also demonstrates the need for
voltage control at the load bus, which is necessary if that bus is islanded, but also
may be necessary for an event that limits the reactive power support to that bus.
In this chapter, we found that risk is:
• 0% if V2 is above 0.89 p.u.,
• 100% if V2 is below 0.82 p.u.,
• Lower when the inverter-supplied power matches the load, and
• Risk is di erent throughout the day and year.
Additionally, we can expect that as more renewable energy is integrated into the
grid as NWAs, and as more inverters are added that follow the new IEEE 1547-2018
standard, it is likely that the percentage of inverter-connected power will increase
and that the inverters in the system will become more varied based on the presence





The aim of this chapter is to identify modifications that may be made to existing
inverter systems in order to minimize risk. An IBR-influenced cascading event can
be classified as high impact/low probability, so although the existing risk is not very
high, it is worth the e ort to avoid the devastating impact that is possible.
4.1 Voltage Ridethrough
Based on the current literature, researchers tend to agree that a longer voltage ride-
through time would help the problem. In [9], the authors recommend that inverter
manufacturers eliminate momentary cessation and increase ridethrough time; that
is, inverters “react too quickly to waveform anomalies.” The analysis of the Blue
Cut Fire disturbance also recommended that momentary cessation be decreased and
ridethrough increased [8]. However, there is some disagreement; [24] points out that
European codes require 150ms of ridethrough at 0 volts, which can potentially lead
to equipment damage and increased DC voltage in some types of systems.
On first glance, indeed, voltage ridethrough times appear arbitrary. One theory
is that when inverters started to be used en masse, it made sense that they should
respond quickly; power electronics like inverters can respond much more quickly than
traditional generation. In the presence of a disturbance, fast response time seemed
like it would be a good idea. But just like many other systems, power systems can
oscillate out of control if disturbances get over-corrected [25]. Whatever the original
intentions were, it is nevertheless time for a voltage ridethrough overhaul.
Depending on the situation, increasing the voltage ridethrough may or may not
avoid a cascade. If, for example, a power line goes down and the voltage permanently
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drops, increasing the ridethrough time will only delay the inevitable by a couple of
seconds.
However, if there is a fault that lasts only for a small duration of time, having an
increased ridethrough time may help the system avoid voltage collapse because the
power is still being injected.
Figure 4.1: Situation that is suitable for testing increases in voltage ridethough
Consider the following case: There exists a two-line transmission system similar
to that in Figure 2.2. Suppose there is a short outage and the voltage drops to 0 for 5
cycles (0.083 seconds). Then, one transmission line resumes transmitting power while
the other trips an automatic circuit recloser (ACR). After one second, the ACR closes
and both transmission lines transmit power. This case is represented by Figure 4.1.
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With normal 1547-2003 ridethrough times1, the probability of voltage collapse is
about 18% for no IBRs, and about 20-25% with the addition of IBRs. Current voltage
ridethrough means that the probability of collapse is increased.
IBR (%)
Increase in Amax (“) 0 50 100
1 18.25 23.25 20.5
2.11 18.25 23.25 20.5
6.56 18.25 27 31
9.33 18.25 10 1
12.11 18.25 5 0
Table 4.1: Probability of collapse (%), where “ is the multiple of the 1547-2003 based Amax
With longer ridethrough times, created by making Amax about 10 times bigger,
which is to say “ = 10, probability of collapse goes down to less than 10%. In the
case of 100% IBRs, with “ = 12, this reduces the probability to zero. Ergo, a large
amount of voltage ridethrough can actually help a system avoid collapse if there is a
large amount of IBRs.
To achieve the desired 12-fold increase in Amax, both the voltage limits and the
times spent at those limits will have to be changed. A future area of research would be
finding the ideal balance of voltages and times that would limit the danger from live
equipment. It is unknown if such a large increase in voltage ridethrough is possible
without causing too much damage, but based on these preliminary results, even a
“ = 9 increase could help reduce the risk of a voltage collapse.
Changing the ridethrough in existing inverters would, if it is possible, be an e ec-
tive and very low-cost risk reduction method.
1This is represented by ““ = 1multiplied by Amax” in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, meaning no ridethrough
has been added on to the usual that has so far been used throughout this thesis.
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IBR (%)
Increase in Amax (“) 0 50 100
1 n/a 100 100
2.11 n/a 100 100
6.56 n/a 99.9 99.9
9.33 n/a 23.2 8.66
12.11 n/a 12.9 6.49
Table 4.2: Number of Disconnected Inverters (% of Total), where “ is the multiple of the
1547-2003 based Amax
4.2 Power Factor
One way to define a smart inverter verses a normal inverter is that a smart inverter has
has the ability to generate reactive power, and thus regulate local voltages or perform
power factor correction. Conventional inverters, which are modeled throughout this
thesis, have a unity power factor of 1, meaning that all power is active and none is
reactive. A smart inverter that has a non-unity power factor can inject both real and
reactive power into the grid, and this reactive power helps stabilize the voltage.
In the model presented in this thesis, about 65 percent of the inverters must be
smart inverters in order to have e ective voltage control.2 Although this suggestion
motivates the replacement of inverters for smart inverters, it also means that 100%
substitution is not necessary, so there is less pressure to find and replace old inverter
hold-outs.
2This calculation assumes that the load is 300MW+98.61MVAR = 316MVA, the power factor
is 0.9, and each inverter is capable of supplying 10kVA. Thus, each inverter contributes 9kW +
4.36kVAR. To meet this load, about 35,000 total inverters are needed to meet the active power
demand, and about 23,000 inverters are needed to meet the reactive power demand. This means
that about 65% of the inverters need to be smart inverters for voltage control. The percentage will
vary based on load, power supplied by each IBR, and power factor, but 65% is a good estimate for
planning purposes. The assumption is that all of the demand is met by the IBRs, so if there is any
voltage control from an additional source that proportionately exceeds that from the inverters, less
smart inverters will be needed.
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A non-smart inverter may cost around $400 [26], where a smart inverter with
adjustable power factor can cost upwards of $2,000 [27]. This di erence in price cost
is non-negligible, so an incentive program could encourage people to upgrade their
inverters or buy a smart inverter from the start.
4.3 Ramp Rate
When an inverter disconnects or enters momentary cessation, there is a time delay
before the inverter will reconnect and resume injecting power, described in Chapter 1.
The maximum allowable ramp rate is generally between 1 to 10% per minute depend-
ing on the location [28], which means it would take between 10 minutes to nearly 2
hours to regain normal power levels. Typical ramps rates following momentary cessa-
tion are much faster, although in Blue Cut Fire analysis, it was found that very short
ramp rates (less than 1 second total time) cause brief drops in frequency [8]. This
thesis assumed that an inverter would immediately resume power injection if voltage
rose to acceptable value, which did not occur in any case where typical 1547-2003
suggestions were used, and therefore delayed reconnection was not studied. How-
ever, future research will want to consider and adjust the maximum ramp rate and
reconnection speed that can be used, because resuming power injection quickly is
important, but sudden jumps in power or voltage are damaging to system dynamics,
so the reconnection speed can not be infinite.
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4.4 Long-Term Risk Mitigation
The above strategies will help reduce the risk of and IBR-influenced voltage collapse,
but e ective long-term risk mitigation will take some time to implement. Purchasers
should opt for smart inverters that have a reasonably quick or programmable ramp
rate.
Micro-phase measurement units, or µPMUs, are important grid monitoring devices
that will help sense disturbances in the grid and thereby avoid situations such as
voltage collapse. PMUs measure grid phasors, which include magnitude, frequency,
angle, and timestamp, at a rate of 10-60Hz , which is much higher than SCADA’s
rate of one sample every 4 seconds. PMUs are typically used in transmission systems
where dangerous changes in voltage tend to be quite large. For distribution systems,
which operate at lower voltages and have impactful small changes in voltage, engineers
propose that µPMUs be incorporated. µPMUs have very fine resolution, between 4-
20 times better than normal PMUs, and are able to detect small changes in voltage.
Then, action can be taken to ameliorate the problem before inverters are a ected.
Currently, µPMUs are not widely used in practice, but the price tends to be much
lower than for normal PMUs, so hopefully research will continue and µPMUs will
become a part of everyday grid monitoring [29]. Alternative voltage control will also
be important, both as a function of inverters and in general. As more renewables and






From Chapter 2, we can conclude that a mismatch in supply and demand power, as
well as a larger variance in inverters ‡A, influence a cascading failure to fail more
quickly. More or less IBR power is not a universal solution, but is dependent on a
system’s typical load profile and other system characteristics.
From Chapter 3, we can conclude that risk of voltage collapse is high when the
voltage drops below 0.82 p.u., low when the voltage is above 0.89 p.u., and uncertain
in between these two numbers. The risk is lower when the inverter-supplied power
matches the load, and importantly, risk is di erent throughout the day and year. It
is very dependent on when the sun shines and when the wind blows, as well as the
amount of installed capacity in a particular region.
In Chapter 4, we investigated how the risk of an inverter-influenced voltage col-
lapse event can be mitigated without expensive overhauls to the power grid. We
showed that under at least some circumstances, increasing voltage ridethrough time
can reduce or eliminate the risk of collapse. We also found that about 65% of inverters
need to be smart inverters in order to have meaningful voltage control.
5.2 Related Fields
This work provides good motivation for other fields of study.
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5.2.1 Catastrophe theory
In Chapter 3, we define the transition band to be the range of conditions where either
stabilization or collapse is possible, and in general, we define any voltage below 0.8 p.u.
to be a failure, which is a hard cut-o . Both of these features make catastrophe theory
an ideal way to further study and qualify IBR-influenced cascading failure events.
Catastrophe theory is a “universal method for the study of all jump transitions,
discontinuities, and sudden qualitative changes [30].” Where typical laws of nature
and calculus fail, catastrophe theory can be used.
In Chapter 3, one of the conclusions made was that this work demonstrates the
unpredictability of the outcome from a given situation, which is not fully determined.
In catastrophe theory, one set of circumstances leads to one outcome while another
set of circumstances leads to a di erent outcome. A mix of the two circumstances
may lead to either outcome, and the transition from one outcome to the other is not
fully delineated; there is an area of overlap where either outcome is possible [31]. This
aptly describes the mix of results from Chapter 3, as well as the regions that were
called transition bands. Additionally, applying catastrophe theory may help identify
a ‘point of no return’ where voltage collapse is inevitable. This would likely be related
to the circumstances that lead to a 100% failure rate.
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5.2.2 Islanding and Alternative Voltage Con-
trol
In this context, an island is small grid that is electrically disconnected from the greater
grid. In some cases, islands are necessary because of factors such as geographical
location. In other cases, islands are created on an as-needed basis. If a fault occurs,
it is better to isolate subsystems that have not been a ected yet so that the fault
is unable to cause any harm. IBRs will be, and are for existing islands, important
suppliers of power. Additionally, with the presence of smart inverters, IBRs can act
as a form of voltage control.
Without the presence of generators regulating the voltage, it is necessary for
voltage control to stabilize the voltage, especially since we expect a system with
balance load and supply to run successfully. However, inverters can not solely be
relied on for voltage control in a majority-IBR or island scenario. Preliminary work
in [32] found that the AC/DC ratios in inverters limit their voltage support ability,
which means that inverters are not able to correct all of the voltage anomalies that
they encounter.
5.3 Future Work
This thesis focused on the e ects of cascading failure based of the changing magnitude
of the voltage. Future models should include the frequency component of voltage
as well, because in some cases the changing frequency may cause the inverters to
trip before the magnitude does. And in order to accurately reflect frequency, future
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models should feature a dynamically responding generator. A generator will be able
to respond to changes in frequency by adjusting the speed of rotation. It is yet to
be seen if a generator can compensate quickly enough to keep the voltage within
acceptable boundaries, or whether inverters would begin to disconnect before the
voltage could be adjusted. This is likely to depend on how much spinning reserves
there are in a given system; a system with a large amount of IBR would have a more
di cult time with voltage regulation.
Most of the inverters that are out in nature right now follow the 1547-2003 stan-
dards, which is what the research in this thesis is based on. However, in the future, a
greater percentage of inverters will follow the 1547-2018 standards, which recommend
di erent ridethrough times and allow for more flexibility. Future research will need
to take these times into account, and in general, ‡A will increase.
A future model should also be flexible in the number of busses it can accommodate,
so that larger systems than a two-bus system can be analyzed. The two-bus system
used in this paper illustrates concepts well but does not reflect the complexity found
in real-world systems.
In addition to the future modeling and simulations, inverter parameters must be
further investigated. The results clearly show that the variance in inverter character-
istics is a significant influence on the risk of inverter cascades. However, the extent to
which real inverters vary from one another is not clear. It will be useful to have a re-
alistic variance, ‡A, around the inverter disconnect threshold. In order to be prepared
for future contingencies, it is also necessary to study how ‡A will change with the
addition of new, IEEE 1547-2018 inverters. Another important inverter parameter is
the amount of power supplied by inverter-connected resources to the grid, and one
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will have to research that amount of power as a function of time of day and time of
year, as well as the resources that are used by a particular utility.
The default settings specified in 1547-2018 are similar, but the inverter settings
can be adjusted to allowable ride through times upwards of 20 seconds for some
abnormal voltages [22]. Therefore, it will be necessary to consider a wider variety of
time delays in future work.
Another future area of research would be adjusting voltage ridethrough time to
find the ideal balance of voltages and times that would limit the danger from live
equipment. Since the voltage/time relationship in IEEE-1547 is non-linear, and both
voltage limits and time duration have the potential to be adjusted, there are a wide
number of adjustment combinations that may increase ridethrough, so identifying
times and limits that are both appropriate and implementable is a non-trivial task.
* * *
Voltage collapses that are caused by IBR-influenced cascading failures can and do
happen, but generally should not be a major concern at the present. Problems will
arise if ‘dumb’ inverters are still used to connect IBRs as IBRs continue to increase
as popular NWAs. If the use of smart inverters increases over time, even with large
loads and large amounts of DERs, evidence in this thesis suggests that IBR-influenced
cascades should remain rare to non-existent. This thesis should motivate the use of
smart inverters and careful planning of grid voltage management while tempering the
industry concern about the prevalence of these cascading failure events.
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